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Article XIV, Section 3 of the Illinois Constitution: A
Limited Initiative to Amend the Article on the
Legislature
Ann M. Lousin*
Article XIV, section 3 of the Illinois Constitution allows a limited
initiative procedure to propose amendments to Article IV—The
Legislature—of the Illinois Constitution. This Article describes the
history of the section, analyzes the seven cases interpreting it, and
suggests options for future actions regarding the section.
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legislature, to make constitutional changes.1 Under this section, and its
established process, Illinoisans may gather signatures on a petition to
seek certain amendments to article IV, which relates to the legislature.2
If they collect enough signatures, the constitution may be amended by
voters at a referendum.3 This is normally called the “initiative and
referendum” method of amending a constitution. Thus far, only seven
cases have interpreted this provision, which is one of the most important
political and legal controversies in recent Illinois political life.
This Article delineates the history of article XIV, section 3 against the
history of Illinois’ constitutional amendments, describes its origin at the
Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention in 1969–70, and analyzes the
seven cases concerning section 3. It offers the Author’s view of the
proper way to interpret the section and prediction as to future
developments.
I. THE PURPOSE AND HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS IN
ILLINOIS BEFORE 1969
The preamble and procedures for future constitutional changes are
perhaps the two most significant parts of any constitution. The preamble
describes, usually in aspirational and often grandiloquent language, the
drafters’ reasons for creating the constitution. “We the people of . . .” is
the customary opening. Most American state constitutions have
preambles that track the language of the United States Constitution. It is
generally agreed that preambles do not have the effect of positive law,
but they do express the stated goals of the respective constitution, which
can indirectly lead to constitutional changes.
The procedures for changing a given constitution are called the
“amending provisions.” They set forth the ways that future generations
may decide to change the provisions. In a way, the amending provisions
act as the drafters’ admission that they are not omniscient, and that it will
probably be necessary to amend their handiwork in the future. Drafting
amending provisions is therefore an act of humility on their part.4
Prior to 1969, Illinois was governed by three different constitutions.
The first was drafted in 1818 by Illinois settlers seeking admission to the
union 5 This statehood constitution was a prerequisite for congressional
1.
2.
3.
4.

ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 3.
Id.
Id.
GEORGE D. BRADEN & RUBIN G. COHN, THE ILLINOIS CONSTITUTION: AN ANNOTATED
AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 570 (1969).
5. ILL. CONST. of 1818.
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approval of the admission of the Territory of Illinois as the twenty-first
state.6 The Illinois Constitution of 1818 provided for amendments by a
constitutional convention.7 Under the provision, if two-thirds of the
General Assembly approved a call for a convention and a majority of the
voters voting on the issue of a call approved the call, the legislature would
have to provide for a convention.8 But despite providing for amendment
through the calling of a constitutional convention, the constitution failed
to provide a method by which the legislature itself could propose
amendments.
The second Illinois Constitution was the 1848 Constitution. This
constitution made one very significant change to the amending process:
it allowed the General Assembly to propose amendments to the
constitution.9 But to do so, two-thirds of the members of each house of
the General Assembly had to approve the language of the amendment,
and restrictions applied on how often amendments could be proposed to
each article.10 Clearly, the drafters of the 1848 Constitution were
debating and writing in an age of Jacksonian populism—but not too much
populism.
The third constitution was the 1870 Constitution, the one in effect
when the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention met in 1969. While
somewhat different from the 1848 Constitution, the 1870 Constitution
clearly articulated that only a constitutional convention or the legislature
could initiate amendments.11 The role of “the people” was limited to
voting upon whether to approve the amendments at a ratification
referendum. Because Illinois used the “party circle ballot” until 1890,
the two major political parties effectively controlled the amending
process. With the party circle ballot, if party leaders approved an
6. See, e.g., ANN M. LOUSIN, THE ILLINOIS STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 3–4 (2009)
(discussing frontier Illinois developing the state constitution).
7. ILL. CONST. of 1818, art. VII, § 1.
Whenever two-thirds of the general assembly shall think it necessary to alter or amend
this constitution, they shall recommend to the electors, at the next election of members
to the general assembly, to vote for or against a convention; and if it shall appear that a
majority of all the citizens of the [S]tate, voting for representatives, have voted for a
convention, the general assembly shall, at their next session, call a convention, to consist
of as many members as there may be in the general assembly, to be chosen in the same
manner, at the same place, and by the same electors that choose the general assembly;
and which convention shall meet within three months after the said election, for the
purpose of revising, altering, or amending this constitution.
Id.
8. Id.
9. ILL. CONST. of 1848, art. XII, § 2.
10. Id. (“But the general assembly shall not have power to propose an amendment or
amendments to more than one article of the constitution at the same session.”).
11. ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. XIV, §§ 1–2.
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amendment, legislators would vote for it. The parties then printed the
ballots at their own expense and indicated on the ballot that the “party
position” favored the amendment. In effect, the party leaders were
strongly suggesting to their voters that anyone who chose the party ballot
should vote as the party wished. As a practical matter, the legislature did
not submit amendments to the voters unless both parties agreed on them.
Invariably, voters would follow the party’s suggestion by putting an “X”
in the circle next to the party’s name.
In 1891, Illinois adopted the modern Australian ballot, which meant
that a voter had to choose which candidate or proposition he or she
approved. A voter could not simply place an “X” in the party circle, but
rather had to identity which party candidate he or she approved. As a
result of the change to the Australian ballot, amending the constitution
became virtually impossible. Indeed, between 1890 and 1950, Illinois
adopted no amendments.
During the twentieth century, it became clear that the districts from
which legislators were elected were extraordinarily malapportioned. For
example, Chicago and its near suburbs experienced huge growth, but that
was not reflected in the redistricting map, which heavily favored the
ninety-six downstate counties, especially the rural areas. After 1945,
when the post-war boom in the suburbs was apparent, the situation
became exacerbated. Those seeking to become statewide executive
officers and United States Senators increasingly sought votes in Chicago
and its near suburbs. Constitutional amendments had virtually no chance
of adoption unless both the downstate legislators and the political forces
in the Chicago area, notably Cook County, were able to agree.
Constitutional revision was at a standstill.
After several unsuccessful attempts to liberalize the amending article,
proponents of constitutional change succeeded in persuading the Illinois
General Assembly to propose, and the voters to ratify, the Gateway
Amendment of 1950.12 The Gateway Amendment continued to require
approval by two thirds of each house, but reduced the approval needed
by the voters to “a majority of those voting on the question.”13
12. Id. art. XIV, § 2.
13. Id. (“Amendments to this Constitution may be proposed in either House of the General
Assembly, and if the same shall be voted for by two-thirds of all the members elected to each of
the two houses, such proposed amendments, together with the yeas and nays of each house thereon,
shall be entered in full on their respective journals, and said amendments shall be submitted to the
electors of this state for adoption or rejection, at the next election of members of the General
Assembly, in such manner as may be prescribed by law. The proposed amendments shall be
published in full at least three months preceding the election, and if a majority of the electors voting
at said election shall vote for the proposed amendments, they shall become a part of this
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Nonetheless, because amendments were so difficult to propose, much less
get adopted, only one amendment succeeded between 1950 and 1968.
That was the major overhaul of the judiciary wrought by the Judicial
Amendment of 1962.
The restrictive nature of the 1870 Constitution’s amending article,
even after the adoption of the Gateway Amendment of 1950, was one of
the major reasons for the call for a constitutional convention in 1968.
Through a series of flukes, the General Assembly agreed to place the
issue of a call on the ballot in 1968. Those favoring constitutional
revision saw their opportunity and began a vigorous campaign. The two
issues that dominated their campaign were first, the desire to modernize
and liberalize the “horse and buggy constitution”; and second, the need
to have a more workable amending process for the future.
II. THE SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
The Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention met on December 8,
1969.
Almost immediately, the convention delegates formed
committees.14 The president of the convention, Samuel W. Witwer, Sr.,
assigned the topic of constitutional amendments to the Committee on
Suffrage and Amending. Mr. Witwer spent much of his adult life seeking
to improve the Illinois Constitution and was one of the prime movers
behind the Gateway Amendment and the call for a convention in 1968.
By that time, it was generally agreed that amendments should be
generated by either a constitutional convention or by the General
Assembly. Disagreement remained, however, over the number of votes
needed for such amendments, the possible submission of a periodic
constitutional convention call to voters, and other amending-process
regulations. These issues occupied much of the committee’s time. But
the committee generally agreed that “liberalization” from past
constitutions was necessary.
The third possible method of amending the Illinois Constitution
surfaced in one member proposal: the popular “initiative and
referendum” method. The delegates were surely aware of the “initiative
and referendum” system so popular in California. At the beginning of
the convention, delegates submitted “member proposals,” or suggestions
for provisions in the new constitution. One proposal specifically called
for a general initiative and referendum procedure for amending a new
constitution. But the general assembly shall have no power to propose amendments to more than
one article of this constitution at the same session, nor to the same article oftener than once in four
years.”).
14. The following is taken extensively from ALAN S. GRATCH & VIRGINIA H. UBIK, BALLOTS
FOR CHANGE: NEW SUFFRAGE AND AMENDING ARTICLES FOR ILLINOIS (1973).
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Illinois Constitution. This proposal, Member Proposal No. 481, offered
by Louis J. Perona, Edwin F. Peterson, Roy C. Pechous, and Ray H.
Garrison, read: “That the Amendment Article of any new constitution
contain a provision as follows: That provision be made for amending the
constitution by means of the initiative and referendum without approval
of the General Assembly.”15 Two other members’ proposals referred to
the option of an initiative and referendum procedure as part of a more
comprehensive proposal for an amending article.16
The nine members of the Committee on Suffrage and Amending split
5–4 over whether a general initiative for amending the Illinois
Constitution should exist.17 Generally, those favoring a general initiative
considered the idea “populist” or “progressive” and viewed the reluctance
of the Illinois General Assembly to propose amendments as evidence that
the submission of separate amendments should not be left solely to the
legislature. Those opposing the general initiative had diverse reasons,
mostly arising out of a fear of denigrating representative government.
Both sides apparently thought that voters would understand the voting
issues. Certainly, neither side suggested otherwise.
The majority and minority reports regarding all facets of the amending
process were debated on “first reading,” the convention’s method of
discussing committee proposals. The debates mirrored the concerns of
the committee. The votes crossed party lines and geographical areas. But
those delegates of the faction called the “Chicago Regular Democrats”
voted against having a general initiative. These were the delegates who
had been supported by the Regular Democratic Party of Cook County,
then headed by Chicago Mayor Richard J. Daley. In the end, the
delegates voted down the general initiative by a vote of forty-four “ayes”
to sixty “nays.”18
15. 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, COMMITTEE
PROPOSALS MEMBER PROPOSALS 3061 (1970) [hereinafter 7 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS].
16. Id. at 2979–80 (“5. Initiative by petition for constitutional amendments, with the initiating
procedure sufficiently difficult to discourage unimportant proposals.” (citing Joseph C. Sharpe, Sr.,
et al.’s Member Proposal No. 313)); see id. at 2981–82, (referencing Ray H. Garrison et al.’s
Member Proposal No. 316, which included a lengthy proposal for initiatives to be presented to the
General Assembly via petitions signed by voters, but to be approved by the legislators).
17. GRATCH & UBIK, supra note 14, at 33–34.
18. Id. at 48–50; 1 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION,
DAILY JOURNAL 186 (1970) (describing the vote on Suffrage and Amending Committee Minority
Proposal 1A). The text and report of Minority Proposal 1A are found at 7 RECORD OF
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 15, at 2307–13. This vote was taken on April 7, 1970. Among those
voting “yes” were two delegates who were later plaintiffs in Coalition for Political Honesty v. The
State Board of Elections (Coalition I), 359 N.E.2d 138 (Ill. 1976): Delegates Elmer Gertz and Louis
Perona. Among those voting “no” were four other plaintiffs in that case: Thomas McCracken, Lucy
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Pursuant to convention rules, the draft of the article on “constitutional
revision” then was sent to the Committee on Style, Drafting &
Submission (“SDS”). That committee made drafting suggestions and
then sent their re-draft back to the convention floor for “second reading.”
At the second reading stage, delegates usually offered amendments to the
“SDS draft.” But legislators had made no effort to amend the proposed
SDS draft by reintroducing a general initiative system.
But around this time, and independently, the Committee on the
Legislature had decided to propose a “limited initiative” method of
amending the draft legislative article.19 The Committee on the
Legislature then submitted its proposals and report to the convention on
June 30, 1970. The majority of the committee proposed a section creating
an initiative and referendum procedure for the first time in Illinois history.
The language of the committee’s proposed section 15 was almost
identical to the language of the final version in article XIV, section 3.20
The report shed some light on the thinking of the six members of the
eleven-member committee who proposed the section.21 The delegates
favoring this proposal were the Chair, George J. Lewis; John L. Knuppel;
Samuel L. Martin; Anthony M. Peccarelli; Louis J. Perona; and William
L. Sommerschield. One of them, Louis J. Perona, was a plaintiff in
Coalition for Political Honesty v. The State Board of Elections
(“Coalition I”)22 in 1976.
Much of the justification for the proposal reads like the dissent in the
Reum, Maurice Scott, and Elbert Smith.
19. 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, COMMITTEE
PROPOSALS 1399–1402 (1970) [hereinafter 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS]. The constitutional
initiative for legislative article reads:
Amendments to this Article on the Legislature may be proposed by a petition signed by
electors of this State equal in number to at least eight percent of the total votes cast for
all candidates for Governor in the preceding gubernatorial election. Amendments shall
be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in this Article on the
Legislature. A petition shall contain the text of the proposed amendment and the date of
the general election at which the proposed amendment is to be submitted, shall be signed
by electors not more than twenty-four months preceding the general election at which
the proposed amendment is to be submitted, and shall be filled with the Secretary of
State at least six months before such election. The procedure for determining the validity
and sufficiency of a petition shall be provided by law. If the petition is valid and
sufficient, the proposed amendment shall be submitted to the electors, and shall become
effective if approved by either three-fifths of those voting on the amendment of by a
majority of those voting in the election.
Id. at 1399.
20. Id. at 1316, 1318.
21. Id. at 1399–1402.
22. Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections (Coalition I), 359 N.E.2d 138 (Ill.
1976).
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most recent Illinois Supreme Court case on article XIV, section 3, Hooker
v. Illinois State Board of Elections,23 discussed below. The first sentence
of the explanation reads: “The primary reason for offering a limited
constitutional initiative proposal for the legislative article is quite simple:
members of the General Assembly have a greater vested interest in the
legislative branch of government than any other branch or phase of
governmental activity.”24
But the report also says that: “Any amendment, so proposed, would be
required to be limited to subjected contained in the Legislative Article,
namely matters of structure and procedure and not matters of substantive
policy.”25 The majority report elaborated and explained what it meant by
“structural and procedural.”26 It explained that “[a]ll proposed
Constitutional amendments submitted through use of this proposal would
be expressly limited to subject matter specifically contained in the
Legislative Article. The subject matter contained in this proposed Article
pertains only to the basic qualities of the legislative branch—namely
structure, size, organization, procedures, etc.”27
Section 15 specifically limited amendments to “structural and
procedural” subject matter. Clearly the subject matter of the proposed
article could not be construed to permit initiative amendments of a
statutory nature. And noticeably, the subject matter of the proposed
article was not laden with the highly complex and emotionally charged
issues which have plagued the constitutional initiative process in other
states.28
Five members of the committee opposed section 1529 and submitted
Minority Proposal 1I.30 They pointed out that the convention had already
rejected allowing an initiative and referendum procedure for amending
the constitution in its consideration of the amending article and that voters
who do not like what legislators do, or do not do, can always vote them
out of office.31 They opposed section 15 on the grounds that it would
result in the submission of many proposed amendments that would not

23. Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, 63 N.E.3d 824.
24. 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 19, at 1399.
25. Id. at 1400.
26. Id. at 1400–01.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1401.
29. The five were Vice-Chair Lucy Reum; Clifford P. Kelley; William J. Laurino; Mary A.
Pappas; and Frank J. Stemberk. Delegate Reum was one of the plaintiffs in Coalition I in 1976.
30. 6 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 19, at 1495–1501.
31. Id. at 1498.
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have the benefit of study and deliberation,32 and that there was no method
of retracting a proposal.33 Finally, it disputed the conclusion that
legislators would never place matters relating to their interests upon the
ballot.34 At no time did the minority discuss the meaning of “structural
and procedural.”
The floor debates on section 15 and Minority Proposal 1I began on
July 15, 1970. Mr. Perona presented the arguments for the limited
initiative, while Mrs. Pappas presented the arguments against it. The
debates indicate that at least some of the delegates thought that a
“unicameral legislature” and “cumulative voting” were the key areas in
which a constitutional initiative would be appropriate.35
On July 21, 1970, the delegates entertained the “perfecting process” of
the proposals of the Committee on the Legislature, which is to say,
adoption on the first reading stage. The debate on section 15 followed
extensive debates on other parts of the proposed article, especially the
highly contentious issue of whether to select representatives through
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 1498–99.
Id. at 1500.
Id. at 1500–01.
4 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VERBATIM
TRANSCRIPTS 2710–12. The colloquy between Delegates Perona and Tomei indicates that the
amending process would allow changes to various aspects of the legislature:
MR. TOMEI: . . . . I had a question for Delegate Perona on the language of this proposal.
With respect to this limitation, that I think has just been discussed, on structural
procedural subjects contained in this article, I take it it [sic] is not the intention of the
committee to limit the initiative just to those things presently contained in the legislative
article.
MR. PERONA: Yes. That’s correct. . . . If you get too specific with the limitation, you
inhibit the possibility of change within the legislative setup; and if you leave it broad, of
course, they say, “Well you might be able to bring in something else under it.” So we’ve
attempted to do it by the explanation as to what our purposes are, and then to leave the
question of abuse to the courts. A unicameral legislature would be an area where you’d
have to change many things that would be in here if anyone would ever want to go to
that. . . .
MR. TOMEI: So, in other words, that’s a change in . . . structure, a particular structure
not contained in the present article but one which would be a proper subject for initiative
under this clause, that is, unicameral—
MR. PERONA: That is correct. That is the major reason that we could not limit it to
certain sections.
MR. TOMEI: All right. And would the same be true for questions of election? And I
amplify that by saying that you refer to structure, size et cetera; and under the pertinent
sections of this proposed article, the first grouping of them—power, structure,
composition, and apportionment—you do deal with size and of elections. You deal with
cumulative voting—matters of that nature—and is that the kind of thing, also, that would
be subject to initiative under this proposed section 15?
MR. PERONA: Yes. Those are the critical areas, actually.
Id. at 2711–12.
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single-member districts versus cumulative voting.36 The vote on section
15 took the form of a motion to adopt the Minority Proposal 1I, which
would have deleted section 15. By a “show of hands,” the delegates voted
to reject the minority’s motion to delete, thereby allowing section 15 to
continue as part of the proposed legislative article.37 In the end, the SDS
Committee moved the Committee on the Legislature’s idea for an
initiative from the legislative article to article XIV—Constitutional
Revision.
What was the reason for the limited initiative, which arose fairly late
in the convention? The answer lies in the convention’s continuing debate
over a key issue regarding the legislature: whether the Illinois House of
Representatives should be elected from three-member districts, with each
voter being able to “cumulate” votes, or whether the Illinois House should
be elected from single-member districts, as is usually the case in the
United States. A brief history of the unique Illinois House election
system is in order.
In 1869, Illinois was divided sharply between Republicans in the
growing northern part of the state and Democrats in the rest of the state.
Many of the Democrats in Southern Illinois even favored the
Confederacy during the Civil War. This deep division along party lines
made it almost certain that no Democrat could be elected in the northern
part and no Republican could be elected in the southern part. In effect, a
voter favoring a “minority party” in each area cast a useless vote.
To ameliorate this polarization, Delegate Joseph Medill, publisher of
the Chicago Tribune, proposed that each legislative district be comprised
of three members, and that a voter could cast three votes for one candidate
(the so-called “bullet vote”), one-and-a-half votes each for two
candidates, or one vote for each of the three candidates.38 If each party
ran two candidates for three positions, it was quite clear that two
representatives would usually come from the majority party and one
candidate from the minority party.
For most of the next century, this prediction held true. Control of the
House shifted back and forth between the two parties, although the
legislative-districting map favored downstate until the 1960s. In the early
twentieth century, when Chicago and a few other areas became
Democratic strongholds, and most of downstate, including the Chicago
suburbs, became Republican strongholds, a “minority member”
invariably existed in each district. The pros and cons of the system are
36. Id. at 2912–15 (quoting the debate on section 15 and the vote).
37. Id. at 2915.
38. LOUSIN, supra note 6, at 10.
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debatable.
And debate was what the delegates did. It is perhaps impossible to
perceive today how passionately many people, including delegates, felt
about the unique Illinois House system. At various points, it seemed as
though the convention would fall apart over this issue. Delegates would
sometimes threaten to walk out of the convention if they thought that the
proposed constitution favored the House-election method that they
opposed.
By the end of the convention, in August 1970, it was clear that the
amending process was already quite liberalized, and the advocates of
single-member districts feared that they might not be able to obtain their
desired change through the 1970 Constitution. As to the first issue, there
was no felt need for a general initiative for constitutional amendments,
given the reduced votes needed for proposing and ratifying amendments
and the introduction of a periodic call on whether a convention should be
called.39 As to the second issue, there was still the fear that the system
of electing the House would not be changed. Proponents of the singlemember district system saw their goal receding fast and were furious.
The stage was set for a classic political compromise: find a way for
future generations of Illinoisans to institute single-member districts for
House elections. But, it was clear that the General Assembly would not
approve such a measure. Many did not want to rely on a new convention,
the call for which would be placed on the ballot no less frequently than
every twenty years. What could be done? The answer was a
multipronged compromise concerning the form of the ballot for the
ratification referendum and the insertion of something new: the limited
initiative for amendments to the legislative article.
The “great compromise” was two-faceted. First, the convention
submitted the issue of election of members of the Illinois House of
Representatives to the voters as a “separate issue” at the referendum on
the constitution held on December 15, 1970. Voters were asked to choose
between a modified system of multimember districts with cumulative
voting and a new single-member-districts system. Ultimately, voters
chose the modified multimember-districts-with-cumulative-voting
system.40 Second, the voters could utilize what became article XIV,
section 3 to change to a single-member-districts system.41 Arguably,
39. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. XIV, § 1(b) (“If the question of whether a Convention should be
called is not submitted during any twenty-year period, the Secretary of State shall submit such
question at the general election in the twentieth year following the last submission.”).
40. Ann M. Lousin, 45 Years Later, Three Unsolved Issues from 1970 Won’t Go Away, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., June 30, 2012, at 5.
41. Id.
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there was a third facet to the compromise: article XIV, section 1(b) allows
voters to decide whether to call a constitutional convention every twenty
years. If the single-member-districts coalition had not succeeded in 1980
with the “Cutback Amendment,” they would have almost certainly
advanced the cause of calling another convention in 1988, when that issue
appeared on the ballot for the first time.
III. THE EARLY CASES: COALITION I, COALITION II, AND LOUSIN
The first attempt to use article XIV, section 3 occurred shortly after the
1970 Constitution became effective on July 1, 1971. The League of
Women Voters of Illinois (“League”) attempted to gather enough
signatures to place a “single-member-districts initiative” on a referendum
in 1974.42 The League had a long-standing position that favored electing
the members of the Illinois House by the traditional single-memberdistricts system.
This effort failed because few voters were willing to engage in
redistricting the Illinois House only four years after redistricting both
chambers in 1971. Even those who favored switching to a singlemember-districts system were unwilling to cause chaos in the middle of
the decade by having a second redistricting. In short, the effort failed,
although many proponents said they were simply waiting until 1980 when
another Illinois General Assembly redistricting would transpire.
The first petition to gather enough signatures did not concern singlemember districts. Instead, it concerned three “ethics” measures proposed
by the Coalition for Political Honesty, a new political action group
spearheaded by Pat Quinn. Quinn, a former member of Governor
Walker’s staff, saw the possibilities of the initiative and referendum
process in an age of computers.
By the 1970s, computers had begun to transform political campaigns,
including “issues” referenda, such as constitutional amendments.
California, which has long used the initiative and referendum process to
adopt both constitutional amendments and statutes, saw a proliferation of
initiatives. Political operatives established consulting offices that
oversaw the gathering of petition signatures. But the majority of the
petitions were never filed and therefore never voted upon. Indeed, the
whole point of the petition drive was often the gathering of signatures of
voters who had indicated their preference for a policy. The political
operatives could then sell those signatures to candidates running for
office, so that the candidates would be better able to find “likely
supporters” in their districts. Computers made the process more efficient.
42. LOUSIN, supra note 6, at 92.
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Quinn and his supporters found three issues almost guaranteed to win
the support of many Illinois voters. One in particular arose from a miniscandal: the payment of an entire term’s salary to legislators at the
beginning of their term, rather than monthly or semi-monthly throughout
the term, which had been the custom for decades. In the time when the
General Assembly met only for six months every two years, and then
rarely met again, this custom may have made some sense. If a legislator
vacated office, usually by death, there was usually no need to fill the
vacancy.
But by the early 1970s, the General Assembly met for a substantial
period every spring and then for approximately two weeks every autumn,
in the “veto session.” In effect, it was “in continuous session.” The 1970
Illinois Constitution enabled, indeed encouraged, the filling of a
legislative vacancy. This meant that there could be two salaries paid to
two separate legislators over a two-year term.
In 1975, Senator Esther Saperstein of Chicago resigned her office early
in the term, but after she accepted the full-term salary.43 Her successor
also received a full-term salary. Understandably, many voters grew angry
over the potential of multiple salaries and demanded that the legislature
change the system. The legislature refused to do so.
The three article IV, section 3 petitions thus became very popular.
Quinn and his colleagues had little difficulty garnering enough signatures
and filed the petitions with the Illinois State Board of Elections so they
could be placed on the ballot in November 1976.
A. 1976: Coalition I (Gertz)
At this point, five former delegates to the Sixth Illinois Constitutional
Convention and one staff member44 filed a taxpayer’s suit to prevent any
expenditure of funds in an effort to hold the referendum. Because the
lead plaintiff was Elmer Gertz, a delegate, it was filed as Gertz v. The
State Board of Elections; but in reporters, the name of the Quinn
coalition, the Coalition for Political Honesty, appears as the plaintiff of
Coalition I: Coalition for Political Honesty v. The State Board of
Elections.45
43. She was running for a seat as an alderman in Chicago. When she won, she considered
keeping both her senate seat and her seat on the Chicago City Council. This was legally permissible
as long as she did not take her municipal salary for days spent attending senate sessions. In the
end, she resigned her senate seat, but her actions annoyed, indeed infuriated, many Illinoisans.
44. This staff member was the Author of this Article.
45. Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections (Coalition I), 359 N.E.2d 138, 138 (Ill.
1976).

912

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 48

The first issue was whether the case was timely; in particular, whether
the court could rule on the constitutionality of the three amendments
before the election was held.46 After all, if the amendments were not
adopted by the voters, the issue of the constitutionality of the amendments
would be moot. The plaintiffs argued that as taxpayers they wanted to
prevent unnecessary expenditures of public funds to hold a referendum
on amendments that were, in their view, clearly improper under article
XIV, section 3.47 The Illinois Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiffs.48
Since 1976, the issue of whether proposed amendments met the standards
for validity under the Illinois Constitution has been decided before the
November referendum.
The second and central issue of the case concerned the construction of
the sentence, “[a]mendments shall be limited to structural and procedural
subjects contained in Article IV.”49 Clearly, the language evidenced an
intent to countenance a rather narrow, limited initiative, rather than a
broad initiative. There were two subissues: the meaning of “and” and the
definitions of the words “structural” and “procedural.” The plaintiffs
claimed that “and” was a true conjunction, and that none of the
amendments were truly “structural” or “procedural.”50
In the end, the case was decided upon the meaning of “and.” Drafters
of documents have long dealt with the conundrum of “and” and “or” in
the English language. Sometimes, the phrase “A and B” means that both
A and B must be present. The Latin language was simpler: et meant A
and B together. Vel meant A and B together, A but not B, or B but not
A; in effect, what we now call “and/or.” Aut meant A but not B, or B but
not A.
Because the phrase “and/or” is not favored in modern English,51 most
drafters of documents convey vel or “and/or” choice by saying this:
If one or more of the following conditions is met, then . . . (such and
such may occur):
1) A;
2) B.

In effect, most modern drafters really intend to convey vel (and/or).
In 1970, the constitutional provision in question arose on the floor of
the convention. The motive for it, as we saw, was to provide a mechanism
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 140.
Id. at 142.
Id. at 143.
Id. at 144.
Id.
Though the Author of this Article prefers it, the grammar books do not.
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by which supporters of the single-member-districts method of election
could place the issue on the ballot without having to engage in the futile
exercise of first attempting to convince the General Assembly that the
method of electing one of the houses of the legislature should be
abandoned. Scant attention was paid to such niceties of et, vel, and aut.52
Six of the seven justices of the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the
plaintiffs’ argument that “and” meant a true conjunctive, an et.53 One
justice, the highly respected jurist Walter V. Schaefer, dissented because
he believed that the proper construction was “and/or,” or vel.54
After 1976, it was evident that a taxpayer’s action was the proper
method of challenging an initiative and referendum proposition and that
the issues should be decided before the referendum could be held. It was
also clear that those seeking to put an initiative amendment on the ballot
would have to place both a structural and procedural subject into the
package. Having just a structural subject, or having just a procedural
subject, would not suffice.
B. 1980: Coalition II (the Cutback Amendment)
As the 1980 federal decennial census approached, another attempt to
use article XIV, section 3 to transform Illinois House elections into a
single-member-districts system seemed almost certain. A few months
earlier, the legislature had voted its members a substantial pay raise,
which angered many voters.
This time, Pat Quinn and the League joined forces with some other
advocates of single-member districts. They gathered signatures on
petitions. Because they needed both a “structural” change and a
“procedural” change, they actually placed two changes into the
amendment: besides changing to single-member districts, the amendment
would cut the size of the House by one-third, from 177 members to 118
members.
This second change gave the amendment its popular name: the
Cutback Amendment. Quinn maintained that “cutting back” and having
fewer legislators would save the State money. The League’s primary
objective was to abolish three-member districts and the cumulativevoting system, but that change remained secondary in the public’s view.
Those gathering petitions would stand at bus stops and say loudly,
“sign a petition to get rid of a third of the Illinois House.” Very few
52. This is perhaps true in other parts of the Illinois Constitution; it is certainly true in legislation
drafted about that time and in older constitutions and statutes.
53. Coalition I, 359 N.E.2d at 143–44.
54. Id. at 147–49 (Schaefer, J., dissenting).
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commentators, let alone members of the public, discussed the other
change. Observers of Illinois state government were aware that first,
cutting the size of the House, would probably save little or no money
because the number of serious issues to be dealt with would remain the
same, and second, the change to single-member districts would virtually
eliminate bipartisan representation in each district.55
The Illinois Supreme Court decided the inevitable challenge in
Coalition for Political Honesty v. The State Board of Elections
(“Coalition II”).56 In 1980, it was clear that, whatever “structural” and
“procedural” meant, the main thrust of the amendment conformed to the
motive behind article XIV, section 3: to provide a single-member districts
system for electing the Illinois House. But those filing objections raised
a different argument, one based on the long-standing “free and equal
elections” clause contained in article III, section 3 of the Illinois
Constitution: “All elections shall be free and equal.”57
Case law had indicated that putting two unrelated subjects together into
one referendum violated that guarantee of “free and equal.”58 Therefore,
pursuant to case law, the objectors pointed out that cutting the size of the
House and changing the method of election were not necessarily related.
In fact, the constitutional convention had offered voters the choice of
methods of electing the House in 1970, without changing the number of
members of the House. The first separately submitted proposition offered
a choice of multimember districts with cumulative voting (a modification
of the system then in place) or of single-member districts. Clearly, the
method or procedure of electing House members was different from
establishing the structural question of the number of House members.
The court found that though the procedural method and the structural
question were different, “combining the two questions relating to the
same subject was not a violation of the ‘free and equal’ elections
clause.”59
To date, the 1980 Cutback Amendment remains the only proposed
amendment to pass muster in article XIV, section 3. The voters adopted
55. The Author encountered one of the young petition passers at the corner of Michigan Avenue
and Pearson Street in Chicago, Illinois. He was shouting: “Sign this petition and get rid of a third
of the Illinois House.” The Author asked him what else the petition did. He said: “It gets rid of
legislators and saves money.” When the Author asked to see the petition before she signed it, he
said petulantly: “If you’re not going to sign my petition, I won’t let you look at it. You’re wasting
my time!” There were reports of similar encounters around the state.
56. Coal. for Political Honesty v. State Bd. of Elections (Coalition II), 415 N.E.2d 368 (Ill.
1980).
57. ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. III, § 3.
58. Vill. of Deerfield v. Rapka, 296 N.E.2d 336, 339–40 (Ill. 1973).
59. Coalition II, 415 N.E.2d at 379.
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the amendment in November 1980, and the redistricting that took place
in 1981 had to take into account both the reduction in numbers and the
need to split a senate district into two “legislative districts” for election
of two House members.
C. 1982: Lousin
After the 1976 and 1980 cases, it was not clear which types of
amendments would be permitted. The Illinois Supreme Court seemed to
indicate that the main reason for having the initiative method, changing
the method of electing the Illinois House, would certainly be
acceptable.60 But it also maintained that there had to be both structural
and procedural changes, a situation that arguably could run afoul of the
“free and equal” elections clause in article III, section 3.61
The next challenge came in 1982. The Coalition for Political Honesty
proposed a system by which initiatives and referenda could enact statutes.
In other words, it was a “legislative bypass” system for voters, similar to
the one used for decades in California. Again, former delegates and a
staffer from the 1970 convention objected. This time, the case went no
further than the Illinois Appellate Court. In Lousin v. The State Board of
Elections,62 the court held that such a proposal went to the powers of the
legislature, not to structural and procedural subjects. 63 Therefore, it was
not within the requirements of article XIV, section 3 and could not appear
on the November 1982 ballot.
After the first three cases, it was clear that Illinois judges favored
interpreting article XIV, section 3 narrowly, requiring that both structural
and procedural subjects be present. The judges also looked at the purpose
of the section, which was primarily, if not exclusively, to find a way to
elect members of the Illinois House of Representatives by singlemembers districts.
IV. THE TWO 1990S CASES: CBA I AND CBA II
Between 1982 and 1990, there was apparently little appetite to use the
initiative system to amend the Illinois Constitution. But with the growth
of conservative or libertarian political groups in the Chicago suburbs in
the 1980s, the political impetus to amend the constitution shifted from
60. Id. at 375–76.
61. Id. at 382.
62. Lousin v. State Bd. of Elections, 438 N.E.2d 1241, 1246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).
63. The Author was lead plaintiff, at the suggestion of the former President of the Convention.
Mr. Witwer generously said that she labored for the constitution “in the background” and ought to
have her name prominently featured in at least one case.
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“liberal” groups, like the Coalition for Political Honesty, to more
“conservative” groups.
This change gave rise to two separate cases—The Chicago Bar
Association v. The State Board of Elections (“CBA I”), in 1990,64 and The
Chicago Board Association v. The Illinois State Board of Elections
(“CBA II”), in 1994.65 In these two cases, the Chicago Bar Association
(“CBA”) attempted to prevent proposed amendments from appearing on
the ballot.66
In CBA I, a group called the Tax Accountability Amendment
Committee (“TAAC”) sought to put on the ballot an amendment to article
IV that would make substantial changes in how the General Assembly
treated tax bills.67 Among other things, it established the structure of a
Revenue Committee in each house and most importantly, required a
three-fifths vote in each house to raise taxes.68 The CBA filed a challenge
64. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. State Bd. of Elections (CBA I), 561 N.E.2d 50 (Ill. 1990).
65. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections (CBA II), 641 N.E.2d 525 (Ill. 1994).
66. In Chicago Bar Association v. State Board of Elections (CBA I), the Chicago Bar
Association (“CBA”) sought to prevent the Illinois State Board of Election from spending public
money to place the proposed “Tax Accountability Amendment” on the Illinois election ballot. CBA
I, 561 N.E.2d at 51–52. In CBA II, the CBA filed another taxpayer action to prevent the placement
of a proposed amendment to the Illinois Constitution regarding term limits on the ballot. CBA II,
641 N.E.2d at 526.
67. CBA I, 561 N.E.2d at 51–52.
68. Id. at 52. The proposed amendment regarding the “Passage of Revenue Bills” contained the
following text:
(a) A bill that would result in the increase of revenue to the State may become law only
by a vote of three-fifths of the members in each house of the General Assembly.
(b) Each house of the General Assembly shall have a revenue committee. It shall be the
sole and the exclusive responsibility of the revenue committees to consider all bills
which would result in an increase or decrease of revenue to the State. A bill pending in
a revenue committee must be approved by a majority of members of that committee
before it is sent to the full house for consideration or vote.
(c) There shall be 25 members on the revenue committee in the House of
Representatives. The members of the House Revenue Committee shall be appointed by
the Speaker of the House and the House Minority Leader. The membership of the
committee shall be proportionally as close arithmetically as possible to the percentage
of members in the House of Representatives who vote for the Speaker and who vote for
the Minority Leader. There shall be 13 members on the revenue committee in the Senate.
The members of the Senate Revenue Committee shall be appointed by the President of
the Senate and the Senate Minority Leader. The membership of the committee shall be
proportionally as close arithmetically as possible to the percentage of members in the
Senate who vote for the Senate President and who vote for the Senate Minority Leader.
Revenue committee members may be removed from the committee only by a majority,
recorded, roll call vote of all members of the committee's respective chamber. No
member of the General Assembly may serve more than four consecutive years on a
revenue committee.
(d) The revenue committees may not vote upon a bill until a public hearing on the bill
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based on the holdings in the Coalition I and Lousin cases.
As expected, the case went to the Illinois Supreme Court, which held
unanimously that the amendment violated the limitations set forth in
article XIV, section 3.69 The nub of the opinion was that the changes
sought would go to the substantive “powers” of the General Assembly,
not just to “structural” and “procedural” changes, and therefore could not
be proposed as an amendment on a ballot through the initiative
procedure.70
The second case—CBA II—arose in 1994.71
Two separate
organizations, the “Eight is Enough Committee” and the “Term Limits
Committee,” sought to put on the ballot a measure to limit each
legislator’s service in the General Assembly to eight years.72 Again, the
has been held. Reasonable notice of the hearing, which in no event may be less than two
weeks, shall be given to the public.
Id. at 52–53.
69. Id. at 55–56.
70. Id.
71. CBA II, 641 N.E.2d at 525.
72. The two organizations sought to impose limits on “the number of years a member of the
General Assembly may serve.” Id. at 529. The organizations’ amendments regarding the
“Legislative Composition” provision in the Illinois Constitution read (additions are italicized):
(a) One Senator shall be elected from each Legislative District. Immediately following
each decennial redistricting, the General Assembly by law shall divide the Legislative
Districts as equally as possible into three groups. Senators from one group shall be
elected for terms of four years, four years and two years; Senators from the second group,
for terms of four years, two years and four years; and Senators from the third group, for
terms of two years, four years and four years. The Legislative Districts in each group
shall be distributed substantially equally over the State. For the exclusive purpose of
calculating of service under the tenure limitation contained in Section 2(c), a person
who serves two years or less of a term of a Senator shall be deemed to have served two
years and a person who serves more than two years of a four-year term of a Senator
shall be deemed to have served four years.
(b) Each Legislative District shall be divided into two Representative Districts. In 1982
and every two years thereafter one Representative shall be elected from each
Representative District for a term of two years. For the exclusive purpose of calculating
length of service under the tenure limitation contained in Section 2(c), a person who
serves any part of a term of a Representative shall be deemed to have served two years.
(c) To be eligible to serve as a member of the General Assembly, a person must be a
United States citizen, at least 21 years old, and for the two years preceding his election
or appointment a resident of the district which he is to represent. No person shall be
eligible to serve as a member of the General Assembly for more than eight years. No
person who has served six years in the General Assembly shall be eligible to be elected
to a four-year term as a Senator. This tenure limitation is not retroactive and shall not
apply to service as a member of the General Assembly before the second Wednesday in
January, 1995. In the general election following a redistricting, a candidate for the
General Assembly may be elected from any district which contains a part of the district
in which he resided at the time of the redistricting and reelected if a resident of the new
district he represents for 18 months prior to the reelection.
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CBA filed a challenge. The 1994 Illinois Supreme Court case, CBA II,
was quite different from the 1990 CBA I case.
In CBA II, the majority of the court signed a per curiam opinion
holding that the eight-year-term-limit proposal went to the issue of the
eligibility of people running for legislative seats, not to either structural
or procedural subjects, as article XIV, section 3 requires.73 This posture
conforms to the “narrow” or “conservative” approach exhibited in
Coalition I, Lousin, and CBA I. But Justices Harrison, Miller, and Heiple
wrote a dissent. Although the rather lengthy dissent touched upon the
philosophy expressed in previous cases, especially in CBA I, the heart of
the dissent significantly consisted of these sentences: “The proposed
term-limit amendment challenged here would in no way produce a
substantive change in the constitution. The proposal relates solely to the
composition of the legislature as set forth in section 2 of article IV . . .
.”74 In effect, the dissenters hearkened back to the 1980 case, Coalition
II, which discussed the Cutback Amendment.75 That, too, dealt with the
“composition” of the legislature, although it concerned the issue at the
core of the initiative proposal, namely single-member districts. The fact
that CBA II was a 4–3 decision ought to have signaled that a window of
opportunity might exist to craft a successful amendment to the Illinois
Constitution under article XIV, section 3. Despite the window of
opportunity created by the Cutback Amendment in 1980 and suggested
by the three-justice dissent in 1994, no attempts to use article XIV,
section 3 occurred throughout the next decade.
V. THE “REDISTRICTING” AND “TERM-LIMITS” CASES IN 2014 AND 2016:
THE CLARK AND HOOKER CASES
In 2014, two organizations separately attempted to place amendments
on the ballot: the Yes for Independent Maps Committee sought to place
a new method of redistricting the General Assembly on the ballot,76 and
Id. at 529–30.
73. Id. at 528–29.
74. Id. at 533–34 (Harrison, J., dissenting) (referring to ILL. CONST. of 1970, art. IV, § 2).
75. Id.
76. Clark v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2014 IL App (1st) 141937, ¶ 1, 17 N.E.3d 771, 773.
Pursuant to article XIV, section 3, the Term Limits Initiative would amend three sections
of the legislative article of the constitution (Ill. Const. [of] 1970, art. IV). In section 1
of the legislative article, titled ‘Legislature—Power and Structure,’ the amendment
would decrease the number of legislative districts1 from 59 to 41 and increase the
number of representative districts from 118 to 123. The proposed amendment would
also make changes to three parts of section 2 of the legislative article, titled ‘Legislative
Composition.’ In section 2(a), the amendment would eliminate staggered terms for
Senators and make all Senate terms four years. In section 2(b), each legislative district
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the Committee for Legislative Reform and Term Limits Committee
sought to put an “eight-is-enough” proposal on the ballot, similar in
nature to the one struck down in 1994.77 Apparently, the two groups
gathered petition signatures separately from each other.
The history of Clark v. The State Board of Elections is different from
the preceding five cases in several respects.78 First, the case involved
two separate proposals, each arguably presenting different issues.
Second, the circuit court’s opinion discussed the redistricting proposal,
although that issue was not yet ripe.79 It was not yet ripe because the
Board of Elections was still trying to determine whether the petition had

would be divided into three representative districts, instead of two.
Id. ¶ 5, 17 N.E.3d at 774.
77. “Additionally, the amendment would create section 2(f), which would impose an eight-year
term limit on all members of the General Assembly.” Id. ¶ 5, 17 N.E.3d at 774.
78. Id. ¶ 5, 17 N.E.3d at 774.
79. Clark v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 14 CH 07356 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2014).
[R]edistricting appears to be fair game for amendment by Article XIV, § 3, initiative. . .
. [T]he structural and procedural subjects of Article IV, § 3, titled Legislative
Redistricting, could be the basis of a valid Article XIV, § 3, initiative. Plaintiffs are
correct, however, that the Redistricting Initiative contains provisions that are neither
structural nor procedural under CBA II and, therefore, the initiative is not limited to the
structural and procedural subjects in Article IV. . . . The clearest example of an
impermissible subject is the inclusion of eligibility or qualification requirements for
Commissioners, including a prohibition on any Commissioner or Special Commissioner
serving as a legislator or in various appointed or elected offices for ten years after serving
as a Commissioner. Though the Redistricting Initiative does not speak directly to
eligibility or qualifications of legislators, the ten-year bar on any Commissioner or
Special Commissioner serving in the General Assembly effectively adds the
qualification that a legislator not have served as a Commissioner in the past ten years.
This qualification renders some potential candidates ineligible and might, in effect, bar
as many individual from serving as legislators at any given time as do term limits,
depending on how many potential legislative candidates have already served two terms.
Furthermore, the service ban is not limited to legislators, but applies to positions outside
of Article IV. . . . Whatever the intent, the ban’s effect is the disqualification of otherwise
eligible candidates. Further, there is no reason to assume that the eligibility or
qualifications of Commissioners is a permissible subject. If eligibility or qualifications
is neither structural nor procedural, then it would appear improper for an initiative to
describe eligibility or qualifications for any positions defined in Article IV. . . [Also,]
nothing in the initiative limits the General Assembly’s power to enact substantive laws;
rather, it limits redistricting power that derives from Article IV. . . Yes for Independent
Maps [argues] that the Redistricting Initiative is limited to Article IV subjects and
eliminating the Governor’s right to veto a plan or the Attorney General’s role in
redistricting litigation does not take this initiative outside of Article IV. This court
agrees. . . . The Redistricting Initiative contains a complicated and detailed plan for
redistricting, yet the plan appears to have a “reasonable, workable relationship to the
same subject’” . . . . because the entire proposition is a new redistricting approach that is
focused exclusively on addressing perceived problems in the current Article IV, § 3.
Id. at 9–11 (internal citations omitted).
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enough valid signatures. Because it was determined that the redistricting
petitions did not contain enough valid signatures, the redistricting issue
should never have been considered and, at least arguably, any statements
made by any court about the constitutional validity of the petitions should
be considered dicta, not holdings.
But the Circuit Court of Cook County entertained, and Judge Mary
Lane Mikva discussed, the challenges to both petitions in Clark.80 Judge
Mikva noted that the five reported cases on article XIV, section 3 indicate
that the precedents favor a narrow interpretation of that section.
Turning to the Term Limits Initiative first, she held that the proposed
amendment was beyond the scope of the initiative system for reasons
indicated in the 1994 CBA II case81 and that it also violated the “free and
equal elections” guarantee in article III, section 3, because it combined
term limits with changes in the staggered terms of the state senate.82
She then discussed Yes for Independent Maps’ proposal. She said that
there were topics in the proposal that were neither structural nor
procedural; in particular, the requirements for being commissioners,
“including a prohibition on any Commissioner or Special Commissioner
serving as a legislator or in various appointed or elected offices for ten
years after serving as a Commissioner.”83 But she also said that the
proposal did not violate the “free and equal” elections clause, because all
of the parts of it came together as a whole.84
This part of Judge Mikva’s opinion appeared to show how future
petitioners could draft a valid proposed amendment, but it is important to
note that all of her comments about the Yes for Independent Maps
proposal are, strictly speaking, dicta, because that proposal had not yet
been certified as having sufficient signatures and was thus not really ripe
for consideration by the court. In fact, the State Board of Elections found
shortly thereafter that the petition had too few valid signatures.
As expected based on the preceding cases, the term-limits-amendment
proponents appealed to the Illinois Appellate Court. But the Illinois
Appellate Court affirmed Judge Mikva’s decision that this was an
improper amendment in Clark.85 And the Illinois Supreme Court refused
to take an appeal. Thus, neither proposed amendment appeared on the
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
780.

Id.
See text accompanying notes 73–74 (discussing CBA II).
Clark, No. 14 CH 07356, at 4–6 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 27, 2014).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10–11.
Clark v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2014 IL App (1st) 141937, ¶¶ 34–35, 17 N.E.3d 771,
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2014 ballot. The Yes for Independent Maps proposal failed because the
backers had gathered insignificant signatures. The term limits proposal
failed because it did not meet the requirements of article XIV, section 3.
The seventh and most recent case addressing article XIV, section 3 is
Hooker v. Illinois State Board of Elections.86 It arose when a group called
Independent Maps made another attempt to change the legislative
redistricting process in 2016. This time the group followed Judge
Mikva’s suggestion that limits on the ability of redistricting
commissioners to run for office were what doomed the previous
redistricting proposal.
In May 2016, Independent Maps—essentially a regrouping of the same
group of plaintiffs from 2014—filed a petition for a redistricting initiative
with the Illinois State Board of Elections.87 The petition proposed
significant amendments to article IV, section 3 of the Illinois Constitution
involving changes to who will draw the district maps,88 the standards by
which district maps are drawn, and how a district map plan can be
challenged.89 Judge Diane Joan Larsen of the Circuit Court of Cook
86. Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, No. 2016CH06539, 2016 WL 4581493 (Ill. Cir. Ct.
July 20, 2016) (order granting the plaintiffs’ motion for judgment on the pleadings).
87. Id. at *1–2.
88. Id. at *10.
The purpose of the 2016 Illinois Independent Redistricting Amendment is to change the
current system of redistricting, where legislators draw the maps of General Assembly
districts after each decennial census, and provide for a restructured, independent
redistricting commission to draw the maps. . . . The Redistricting Initiative would remove
the General Assembly's power to submit a redistricting plan currently provided in article
IV, section 3 . . . . [and instead] would create a new ‘Independent Redistricting
Commission’ (‘IRC’) with authority to draw redistricting plans. The IRC would be
created through a two-step process. The first step would require the Auditor General to
. . . request and accept applications to be a Reviewer. . . . The Auditor General shall then
publicly select by random draw three members of the pool to serve on an Applicant
Review Panel. The second step of the process would require the Auditor General to . . .
request and accept applications to serve as a Commissioner on the IRC. . . . The
Redistricting Initiative provides that approval of a district plan by the IRC requires the
affirmative vote of seven Commissioners, including at least two Commissioners from
each political party whose candidate for Governor received the most and second most
votes cast in the last general election for Governor, and two Commissioners not affiliated
with either of those parties. The IRC is required to file a district plan by June 30 of the
year after the census is completed. If the IRC does not meet that deadline, the
Redistricting Initiative assigns new duties to two individual Justices of the Illinois
Supreme Court. It requires the Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme Court and the most
senior Illinois Supreme Court Justice who is not affiliated with the same political party
to appoint a Special Commissioner for Redistricting, who would be responsible for
conducting an abbreviated version of the IRC map-drawing process and filing a district
plan by August 31(internal citations removed).
Id. at *10–11. (internal citations removed).
89. Id. at *6.
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County initially heard the challenge in Hooker.90 On July 20, 2016, she
issued her opinion, in which she held the proposed amendment invalid
under article XIV, section 3.91
Judge Larsen noted that the convention debates suggested that
“legislative redistricting” could indeed be a subject for an initiative
proposal.92 But she also held that the inclusion of roles for the Auditor
General (in article VIII), new duties for the courts (in article VI), and new
duties for the Attorney General (in article V) caused the proposal to
exceed “structural and procedural subjects” (in article IV).93 She further
held that the conglomeration of topics violated the “free and equal
elections” clause in article III, section 3.94
Independent Maps appealed, and the Illinois Supreme Court took the
case. In Hooker, issued August 25, 2016, the Illinois Supreme Court split
4–3.95 The majority, the four Democrats on the court, essentially
followed Judge Larsen’s reasoning and followed the precedents in the
previous six cases, refusing to extend validity to the Independent Maps
proposal.96
The minority opinion (really three separate dissents in which the
dissenters joined each other’s dissenting opinion) is of great interest. For
the first time, the Illinois Supreme Court enunciated a comprehensive
argument in favor of a broader interpretation of article XIV, section 3.97
To be sure, three justices had dissented in CBA II, but only on whether
“term limits” was a structural or procedural change.98 The dissenters in
Hooker took a broader view, claiming that it was obvious that the
legislature would be unlikely to propose a change in redistricting that
reduced the power of the legislators. Taken in total, they saw the
reference to other officers, including judges, as a way to rearrange the
redistricting process so that nonlegislators could help draw the districts.
The dissenters saw this as an interrelated package, one that dealt with

90. Id.
91. Id. at *18.
92. Id. at *15 (stating that the “very title of article IV, section 3 . . . is ‘Legislative Redistricting,’
so just giving it its plain meaning, the structural and procedural subjects of article IV, section 3
should encompass redistricting”).
93. Id. at *9–15.
94. Id. at *18.
95. Hooker v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections, 2016 IL 121077, ¶ 1, 63 N.E.3d at 824.
96. Id. at ¶¶ 48–49, 63 N.E.3d at 839.
97. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, 63 N.E.3d 824 (Garman, J., dissenting) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(Karmeier, J., dissenting).
98. Chi. Bar Ass’n v. Ill. State Bd. of Elections (CBA II), 641 N.E.2d 525, 529–34 (Ill. 1994)
(Harrison, J., dissenting).
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“structural and procedural subjects” as indicated in the convention
debates and one that did not violate the “free and equal” elections
clause.99
Thus, while the thrust of the seven cases is to espouse a rather
conservative interpretation of article XIV, section 3, in line with the
constitutional history of Illinois, there may well be an opening to
reconsider this interpretation in the future.
VI. THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE XIV, SECTION 3: POSSIBLE
COURSES OF ACTION FOR THE FUTURE
The Author believes that her firsthand involvement with the Illinois
Constitution over the years, and especially as a participant and observer
in the litigation concerning article XIV, section 3, has given her insights
into how this provision should be interpreted.
First, article XIV, section 3 is a departure from previous constitutional
history. The Illinois tradition has been very conservative in its approach
to amending the State’s constitutions. Illinois did not play an important
part in the progressive reform movement at the beginning of the twentieth
century. While initiatives and referenda are part of Illinois local
government, at least as to certain issues, they are not an important part of
state government.
Second, the overwhelming purpose of article XIV, section 3 was to
give the advocates of single-member districts an opportunity to achieve
their goal in case the voters chose to retain the multimember-district
system at the constitutional ratification referendum on December 15,
1970. But the text of article XIV, section 3 and the debates on it were
phrased a little more broadly to suggest that, perhaps under certain
circumstances, the initiative process could be used to effectuate other
types of changes. It is unclear from the debates which other changes
could be included.
Moreover, it is the Author’s recollection from many days spent
observing the debates in the summer of 1970 that mentions of these “other
changes” were really window dressing for the real motive: to protect the
opportunity to have a single-member-districts system. It was necessary
to find some way to satisfy that powerful faction favoring single-member
districts.
Third, the advent of computerization means that a primary goal for
collecting signatures on petitions is to obtain signatures. It is not to see
the measure enacted or anything else. The political operatives who often
advise petition gatherers know how valuable a list of petition signatories
99. Hooker, 2016 IL 121077, ¶¶ 90–91, 63 N.E.3d at 850 (Karmeier, J., dissenting).
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is. It is a financial asset, as far as they are concerned. They further use
the signatures in other campaigns.
Fourth, it seems clear to the Author that both the Coalition I case in
1976 and the Coalition II case regarding the Cutback Amendment in 1980
were decided erroneously, at least in part. As to Coalition I, the word
“and” in the text of article XIV, section 3 really should be read as
“and/or.” But it is debatable in the Author’s opinion whether any of the
three amendments proposed was really either structural or procedural.
As to the Cutback Amendment, it is clear to the Author that it was
improper to combine a reduction in the size of the House (the “cutback”)
with a change in the method of election (cumulative voting for three seats
to single-member districts). The two were completely separate topics in
violation of the “free and equal” elections clause in article III, section 3.
In fact, when the convention submitted the issue of the manner of
selection to the voters as a separate issue, it made no change in the size
of the House. It was clever of the proponents to call the 1980 amendment
the “Cutback Amendment” because that engaged the attention of voters
who were angry with the General Assembly. Many voters were unaware
that they were also voting to change the method of election to the House.
Fifth, the cases since 1980 have shown that arguments can be made for
and against the propriety of the topics covered: how taxation bills are
passed, creation of statutory initiatives, term limits for legislators, and
revising the method of legislative redistricting. The Author believes that,
as a matter of policy, each of the proposals was a bad idea. And more
importantly, the Author believes that the “conservative” approach to
interpretation is the preferable one.
The Author has observed the chaos California’s initiative and
referendum system has created. The Author fears that if Illinois allowed
a liberal approach to initiatives for constitutional amendments (and God
forbid, statutes!), professional political operatives would place petition
gathers on every street corner.
But, in fairness, there is an argument to be made for a broader
approach: one that at least takes into account some of the topics
mentioned in the convention debates. Indeed, now that Illinois has a
single-member-districts system for electing the House, would it not be
proper, based on the Cutback Amendment case in 1980, to place before
the voters an amendment returning to multimember districts with
cumulative voting? The General Assembly is truly unlikely to put such
a proposal before the voters, but why can’t voters obtain petition
signatures to place that issue on the ballot? This reflects a southern
Illinois phrase: “What goes around, comes around.” If the singlemember-districts people can place their issue on the ballot, why can’t the
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multimember-districts-with-cumulative-voting people do it as well?
It remains to be seen what the politically active organizations in Illinois
will propose in the future, and what the Illinois Supreme Court will
decide while interpreting article XIV, section 3.

